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Twombly and Iqbal Should (Finally!) Put the Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud Out of Its Misery

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dc.contributor.author Benham, Dustin B.
dc.date.accessioned 2011-11-01T20:49:02Z
dc.date.available 2011-11-01T20:49:02Z
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.identifier.citation 64 S.M.U. L. Rev. 650 (2011). en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10601/1668
dc.description.abstract This article discusses the history of relief from judgments procured by fraud, how Rule 60(d) independent actions provide judgment relief for interparty fraud claims brought more than one year after the entry of judgment, how Rule 9(b) requires particularized fraud pleading while Twombley and Iqbal require plausible pleading under Rule 8, and a discussion of why the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud should be eliminated. en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Southern Methodist University Law Review
dc.subject Civil Procedure en_US
dc.subject Fraud en_US
dc.subject Vacating Judgments en_US
dc.title Twombly and Iqbal Should (Finally!) Put the Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud Out of Its Misery en_US
dc.type Article en_US


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